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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR.,

:

Appellant,

:

v.

:

Case No. 95-0742
Priority No. 14

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, :
Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended) and
Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
STATUTORY TERM "OVERTIME" WAS REASONABLE.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows this Court
to grant relief where the agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law.

§63-46b-16(4)(d) Utah Code Ann.

In reviewing an application or interpretation of law, the
appellate court is to use a correction of error standard
giving no deference to the hearing officer's conclusion.

-1-

(Utah 1992)
Discretion is granted to the agency's application of the
law only when there is a grant of discretion to the agency,
express or implied, by the statute itself. Stokes v. Board of
Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Ut. App. 1992)
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts.
II.

THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN FINDING

THAT APPELLANT WAS AWARE THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEM HAD
ONLY CONDITIONALLY AGREED TO RESUME ITS ACCEPTANCE OF "GAP
TIME" CONTRIBUTIONS.
An agency's findings of fact are accorded substantial
deference, but may be overturned if not based on substantial
evidence or against the clear weight of the evidence. Harley
v. Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d

524

(Utah 1988), Cal

Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372
(Utah 1995)
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts.
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III.

THE

ADJUDICATIVE

HEARING

OFFICER

ERRED

IN

CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF
FOR APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
This is the same standard of review as stated in Point I.
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts.
IV.

THE

ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARING

OFFICER

ERRED

IN

CONCLUDING THAT THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S INTERPRETATION OF
OVERTIME HAS NOT INTERFERED WITH AN EXISTING EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT AND RESTRICTED THE MEMBERS' RIGHT TO CONTRACT FOR
THEIR LABOR.
This is the same standard of review as stated in Point I.
This issue has been preserved on appeal because appellant
raised the issue in his memorandum submitted to the Hearing
Officer following the submission of stipulated facts.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
§49-1-102, Utah Code Ann.
(1) The purpose of this Chapter is to establish a
central administrative office and a board to
administer the various retirement systems
established by the Legislature.
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to
provide maximum benefits and protections.
§49-4a-103(l) thru (3), Utah Code Ann.
As used in this chapter:
-3-

(1) (a) "Compensation", "salary", or "wages" means the
total amount of payments which are currently
includable in gross income made by an employer to an
employee for services rendered to the employer as
base income for the position covered under the
retirement system. Base income shall be determined
prior to any salary deductions or reductions for any
salary deferral or pre-tax benefit programs
authorized by federal law.
(b) "Compensation" includes performance-based
bonuses and cost-of-living adjustments.
(c)

"Compensation" does not include:
(i) overtime;
(ii) sick pay incentives;
(iii) retirement pay incentives;
(iv) the monetary value of remuneration paid in
kind, as in a residence, use of equipment
or uniform or travel allowances;
(v) lump-sum payment or special payment
covering accumulated leave; and
(vi)
all contributions made by an employer
under this plan or under any other
employee benefit plan maintained by an
employer for the benefit of a participant.

(d) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter may
not exceed the amount allowed under Internal Revenue
Code Section 401(a)(17).
(2) "Final average salary" means the amount computed by
averaging the highest three years of annual compensation
preceding retirement subject to Subsections (a) and (b) .
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), the
percentage increase in annual compensation in any one
of the years used may not exceed the previous year's
salary by more than 10% plus a cost-of-living
adjustment equal to the decrease in the purchasing
power of the dollar during the previous year, as
measured by the Consumer Price Index prepared by
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(b) In cases where the employing unit provides
acceptable documentation to the board, the limitation
in Subsection (a) may be exceeded if:
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(i) the member has transferred form another
employing unit;
(ii) the member has been promoted to a new
position; or
(iii) the years used are not consecutive.
(3)

"Full-time service" means 2,080 hours a year.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This is a Petition for Review of an Adjudicative Hearing

Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to
a decision of the Utah State Retirement System adverse to
appellant, Joseph W. O'Keefe, Jr., hereinafter O'Keefe.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
On July 12, 1994, the Utah Retirement System notified

O'Keefe,

that

contributions

the
for

Retirement

Board

would

not

accept

"GAP time" work of Ogden City police

officers. O'Keefe filed a Request for Board Action appealing
that decision.
A hearing was conducted on May 31, 1995, before
James L. Barker, Adjudicative Hearing Officer.
entered

The parties

into a written Stipulation of Facts which were

submitted to the hearing officer.

After Memorandums were

filed, the hearing officer issued his decision on
October 12, 1995, finding for the Retirement Board.
then timely filed this Petition for Review.
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O'Keefe

III.

DISPOSITION AT AGENCY LEVEL.
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law concluding that the Retirement Board
had correctly interpreted the statutory term of "overtime" and
that

"GAP

time"

contributions.

would

not

O'Keefe's

be

eligible

Request

for

retirement

for Board Action was

dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 12, 1994, the Utah Retirement System notified
O'Keefe, through his counsel, that any hours over 40 per week
would be considered overtime and ineligible for retirement
compensation benefits.

O'Keefe filed a Request for Board

Action and the matter was assigned to an Adjudicative Hearing
Officer for determination.
At the hearing, the parties entered into a written
Stipulation of Facts. That Stipulation was:
1.

Petitioner Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers

similarly situated are public safety employees employed
by Ogden City and have been for the entire period of this
controversy.
2.

On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program

whereby its peace officers, under certain prescribed and
agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more
than 40 hours per week.
-6-

3.

In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between

Ogden City and its employeesf including Petitioner, an
agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess
of 40 hours per week but not more than 43 hours per week
could be treated in either of two ways:
a) The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to
as "GAP" time) could be taken later as leave,
pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or
b)

The "GAP" time could be treated as regular
compensation (paid at regular - not overtime rates),
pursuant to which the officer would receive
additional compensation on which retirement
contributions would be paid.

4.

The

effect

of

the

additional

compensation

and

retirement contribution in the final three (3) years of
Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in
the

monthly

retirement

allowance

of

Petitioner

estimated as follows:
A.

Assuming a May 1, 1995 retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the
additional compensation is used in the calculation of
the retirement allowance, the benefit would be
$1,819.68.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time

-7-

and the additional compensation is not used in the
calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,697.34.
B.

Assuming a July 1, 1995 retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the
additional compensation is used in the calculation of
the retirement allowance, the benefit would be
$1,842.48.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time
and the additional compensation is not used in the
calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,717.80.

Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if GAP time is
determined to be eligible time worked under Utah laws,
would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per
month.
5. In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer
and employee contributions to the retirement systems for
those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional
time

(GAP) worked

received

and

as

credited

"regular
these

compensation".
contributions

to

URS
the

appropriate participating members' accounts, including
Petitioner.
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6.

In 1991 , due to an administrative oversight, no

contributions were sent by Ogden City.

In 1992, Ogden

City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991
and 1992.
7.

Upon

determined

receipt
that

of

the

the

GAP

1992
time

contributions,
contributions

URS
were

ineligible and refunded the GAP time contributions to
Ogden City for the appropriate years.
8.

During

the

period

from

1992

to

the

present,

Petitioner has taken the position that both the original
1990 contribution

and

subsequent

contributions were

eligible and should not have been refunded.
taken

the

contributions

position

that

ineligible

as

the
soon

office
as

it

URS has

ruled
had

the

actual

knowledge of the GAP time issues. Actual knowledge did
not occur until sometime in 1992 when an employee sought
to retire with GAP time included as part of compensation.
9.

During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden

City, Petitioner, and others similarly situated met in an
attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the
law.

During these discussions the retirement office

agreed to resume its acceptance of GAP time contributions
conditionally while an additional study took place on the
feasibility of developing a permanent policy covering
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GAP time contributions. Petitioner believed a permanent
policy had been adopted and the contributions were being
accepted unconditionally.
10. Also during this time another employing unit, Weber
County, requested GAP time coverage.
then

agreed

that

the

board's

All the parties

actuary,

Wyatt

and

Associates, should determine any actuarial impact which
would result from including GAP time in "compensation"
for retirement purposes.
11. The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered
in a letter to M. Dee Williams, Executive Director of
URS, on June 2, 1994:
"As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43hour work week.

However, officers are allowed a choice

between (i) taking direct pay for the 3 hours over the
40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time.
Most officers take the time as comp time, but as they
approach retirement, officers can and do switch to
taking this as pay.

By doing so, they increase their

Average Annual Compensation, resulting

in a higher

retirement benefit.
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate
from 9.8% to 11.7%.

Our calculation assumes that all

members elect to maximize their retirement benefit, i.e.,
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they will be able to plan well enough in advance to
increase their retirement benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of
the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid
for earlier)."
12.

As

a

result

of

the

actuary's

findings

and

conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny GAP time
contributions.

An additional reason for denial was

forwarded - any administrative, i.e. URS decision to
include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit with a
potential cost to all employers and employees, not just
to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the
Legislature, not URS.
13.

Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a

small number of Ogden Public Safety officers actually
received a retirement allowance with GAP time included.
The

retirement

office

has

agreed

to

honor

those

retirements.
14. There are twenty-two (22) Ogden police officers left
in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have elected to take
their GAP time contribution refunds and are excluded from
this dispute.
The Administrative Hearing Officer requested the parties
to file memorandums.

They were submitted and on

October 12, 1995, the AHO issued his decision.
-11-

He concluded

that the Retirement Systems' interpretation of the term
"overtime" was reasonable.

He dismissed O'Keefe's action.

This appeal was taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The AHO failed to use the standard methods for resolving
disputes concerning the meaning of a statutory term.

Had he

done so, he would have concluded that the URS's interpretation
of the term "overtime" was in error. He did not harmonize his
conclusions with the legislature's intent in passing relative
statutes.

Rather, the AHO merely acquiesced to the URS's

interpretation of the term. The URS's interpretation imparts
an uncommon meaning to the term and results in an unreasonable
interference in existing employment contracts. Moreover, the
AHO was clearly erroneous in his finding that O'Keefe and
other members similarly affected failed to carry their burden
of proof in invoking the Doctrine of Estoppel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY TERM "OVERTIME"
FOUND IN UTAH CODE ANN. §49-4-103(1)(c) WAS
REASONABLE.
The AHO concluded that "The Board's interpretation (of
the term "overtime") was not unreasonable".
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A correction of error standard should be used when an
appellate court reviews an agency's interpretation of the law.
Anderson, supra.
An agency's statutory construction should only be given
deference when there is a grant of discretion to the agency
concerning the language in questionf either expressly made in
the statute or implied from the statutory language.

Morton

Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the State of Utah Tax Common,
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

An express statutory grant of

discretion occurs when the legislature directs the agency to
interpret

a

given

statutory

term

by

rule.

Employer's

Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 856 P.2d 648
650 (Utah App. 1993); Chevron v. State Tax Comm'n, 847 P.2d
418, 419 (Utah App. 1993).
There is no statutory provision which grants the URS the
authority or direction to interpret the term "overtime." The
AHO seems to suggest that since "full time service is defined
as 2080 hours", anything in excess is overtime.

O'Keefe has

contended that the 2080 hours is only a minimum number of
hours that an employee must work in order to be considered
full

time

and

therefore

retirement system.

eligible

for

inclusion

in the

It is not a term that imposes a maximum

limitation on qualifying hours.
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The AHO also appears to have based his decision in part
on Utah Code Ann. §49-1-203 which requires the URS to maintain
the system on an actuarial sound basis.

He concludes that

since GAP time would result in increased contribution rates
for employers and employees, it would therefore cause some
actuarial unsoundness in the plan.

The AHO has failed to

consider the explicit legislative intent stated in Utah Code
Ann. §49-1-102(2) providing that the provisions of the Act
should be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits.
While he admits that the inclusion of "GAP time" contributions
would

result

in

substantial

increased

benefits

for the

members, he ignores that statutory mandate of Utah Code Ann.
§49-1-102(2). The conclusion that the inclusion of "GAP time"
contributions would somehow cause the URS to be maintained on
an actuarial unsound basis has no factual basis. Nothing in
the undisputed facts of this case supports this conclusion and
it is illogical.
This action is confined to approximately 22 officers of
the Ogden Police Department who were or had been, at the time
this action was initiated, participating in the established
"GAP time" policy of that police department.
The

actuary's

Stipulations

statement

applies only

if

found

in

all Ogden

Fact

11

Police

of

the

officers

participate in the then existing process. Even then, it would

-14-

only necessitate a rate increase to the employer, not disrupt
the soundness of the plan.
Although the AHO acknowledged that the term overtime
lacked

statutory

interpretation

definition,

was

he

reasonable

held

that

rather

the

than

traditional rules of statutory construction.

URS's

employing

(Findings of

Pact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to Dismiss, page 6
para. 1.)
In Morton, supra, the Court enunciated three rules for
statutory interpretation if the term or phrase was in dispute:
1.

A statutory term should be interpreted and applied

according to its usually accepted meaning, where the
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application
that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in
blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the
statute. At page 590.
2.

The rule of noscitur a sociis provides that the

meaning of questionable words and phrases in a statute be
ascertained

by

reference

associated with them.
3.

to

the

words

or

phrases

At page 590-591.

The terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a

comprehensive whole and not in piecemeal fashion.
At page 591.
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The application of any one of these rules would result in
a determination favorable to O'Keefe.
RULE 1.

A statutory term should be interpreted
and applied according to its usually
accepted meaning, where the ordinary
meaning of the term results in an
application that is neither unreasonably
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant
contradiction of the express purpose of
the statute.

Utah Code Ann. §67-19-6.7(1) ( j ) f Overtime policies for
state employees, defines the term "overtime" as
worked

"actual time

in excess of the employee's defined work

period".

Section l(n) provides that "work period" means:
"(iii) for nonexempt law enforcement and
hospital employees, the period established
by each department by rule for those employees
according to the requirements of the FLSA."
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-6.7(2) provides that
each
department
shall compensate each state employee who works
overtime by complying with the requirements of this statute.
Section (3) provides that:
(a) each department shall negotiate and obtain a signed
agreement from each nonexempt employee.
(b) In the agreement, the nonexempt employee shall elect
either to be compensated for overtime by:
(i) taking time off work at the rate of one and one
half hour off for each overtime hour worked; or
(ii) being paid for the overtime worked at the rate of
one and one half times the rate per hour that the
state employee receives for nonovertime work.
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court held, that state and
local governmental agencies must comply with the provisions of
29 U.S.C. 201, The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Garcia v.

-16-

San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al., 83 L Ed 2d
1016, (1985).

The FLSA was amended and permitted public

agencies employing law enforcement personnel to define work
periods that would result in 43 hour work weeks without paying
overtime.

29 U.S.C. 207.

The Board's interpretation of "overtime" as any hours
worked in excess of 2080 per year, cannot be squared with the
definition for other state employees found in Utah Code Ann.
§67-19-6.7 or the definition of work period proscribed by the
FLSA and applicable to cities.
The AHO's conclusion with respect to the term "overtime"
is therefore unreasonably confused or in blatant contradiction
to the other statutory uses of that term for all other state
employees.
RULE 2. The rule of noscitur a sociis provides
that the meaning of questionable words
and phrases in a statute be ascertained
by reference to the words or phrases
associated with them.
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer erred by ignoring other
statutory terms associated with the term "overtime".
Utah Code Ann. §49-4-103(1)(a) and (b) define what the
legislature has determined

to be

"compensation"

for the

purposes of the Public Safety Retirement Act. Section (l)(c)
defines what "compensation" is not.

-17-

Compensation is defined as "the total amount of payments
. . . made by the employer to an employee . . .
income."

as base

Compensation includes "bonuses and cost of living

increases." It is not in any way tied to a specific number of
hours. Section (l)(c) provides that compensation is not, (i)
overtime, (ii) sick pay incentives, (iii) retirement pay
incentives, (iv) the monetary value of renumeration paid in
kind . . . , (v) a lump-sum payment or special payment .
. . , (vi) all contributions made by an employer
All

terms

associated with

the term

....

"overtime"

are

concerned with the payment of monetary sums, not hours worked.
The statute clearly refers to "overtime compensation."

This

definition is a common interpretation of the term, it is in
line with the federal interpretation of the term, and it
complies specifically with the definition found in Utah Code
Ann. §67-19-6.7(3)(ii) applicable to state employees.
RULE 3.

Interpretation of the term "overtime"
should be in relationship to the
comprehensive whole of the Statute.

Utah Code Ann. §49-1-102(1) provides that the purpose of
legislature in passing the Utah State Retirement Act was to
establish

a central

administrative

office

and

board

to

administer the various retirement systems established by the
legislature. Section (2) provides that the provisions of the

-18-

Title

"shall

benefits. . ."

be

liberally

construed

to provide

maximum

(emphasis added).

The AHO's conclusion that although the inclusion of
contributions stemming from "GAP time" hours would provide
members with a substantial benefit, the URS need not consider
those contributions contradicts this express intention of the
legislature. The whole of the Act is intended for the benefit
of its members, that is, the public safety employees who will
be the retirees of the future.

There is no reason to apply

such a restrictive meaning to the term "overtime". There is
no reason not to provide the greatest benefit to the members.
POINT II
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT WAS AWARE THAT THE UTAH RETIREMENT
SYSTEM HAD ONLY CONDITIONALLY AGREED TO RESUME ITS
ACCEPTANCE OF "GAP TIME" CONTRIBUTIONS.
In his memorandum, submitted after the AHO received the
stipulated facts, O'Keefe contended that URS's agreement to
accept the GAP time contributions and his reliance thereon,
equitably

estopped the Board from later rejecting those

contributions.
In denying O'Keefe's claim of equitable estoppel, the AHO
stated O'Keefe was aware the Board agreed to resume its
acceptance of "GAP" time contributions only conditionally.
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This conclusion is simply not supported by the Stipulation of
Facts. That Stipulation specifically provides in paragraph 9:
"During this same period, officials from URS,
Ogden City, and others similarly situated met
in an attempt to resolve the different
interpretations of the law. During these
discussions, the retirement office agreed to
resume its acceptance conditionally while an
additional study took place on the feasibility
of developing a permanent policy covering GAP
time contributions. Petitioner believed a
permanent policy had been adopted and the
contributions were being accepted
unconditionally." (Emphasis added)
These are the only facts presented relating to O'Keefe's
knowledge as to the reason the URS started re-accepting
contributions for GAP time.
Even more confusing is the AHO's finding that O'Keefe's
awareness of the conditional nature of the URS's reacceptance
of "GAP time" contributions "while an additional study took
place on the feasibility of developing a permanent policy"
somehow equated to foreknowledge that the URS might in the
future discontinue the acceptance of those contributions.
If,

however,

as

O'Keefe

argues,

the

additional

contributions were not prohibited but rather permitted by
statute and the study was merely to determine whether the then
current contribution rate was sufficient, then contributions
rightly should have been accepted and any adjustments could
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easily have been made at a later date to satisfy actuarial
needs•
The only evidence in this case are stipulated facts, and
those facts clearly indicate that O'Keefe did not know of the
conditional

nature

contributions.

of

the

URS's

acceptance

of

the

Nor do the facts support the finding that an

ongoing study being conducted by the URS was determinative of
the continued acceptance of the contributions.

Rather, the

facts clearly show that O'Keefe believed the contributions
were being accepted unconditionally.
POINT III
THE ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO MEET
HIS BURDEN OF PROOF FOR APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are:
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted;

(2) reasonable

action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to
act: and (3) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the act, or failure to act.

Eldridqe v. Utah

Retirement System, 795 P.2d 671 (Ut. App. 1990). In Eldridqe.
the Court said that while as a general rule, the doctrine of
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estoppel may not be asserted against the state and its
agencies, there are some unusual cases where they cannot
reasonably escape the doctrine.

Utah courts have, in fact,

carved out an exception to this general rule where it is plain
that the interests of justice so require. Utah State Univ. v.
Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 720

(Utah 1982); See, e.g.,

Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d
689 (Utah 1979).
The undisputed facts of this case are that URS agreed to
accept all contributions that had previously been rejected and
re-apply

those

contributions

to the

individual

affected

members' accounts and O'Keefe believed that a permanent "GAP
time" policy had been embraced as a result. (Element number
one) He contributed a percentage of his wages to the URS for
over four years for his GAP time hours. (Element number two)
Based upon a projected retirement benefit, O'Keefe made
decisions concerning retirement.

The decision of URS to

subsequently reject the contributions has injured O'Keefe
since his retirement pay is approximately $120 per month lower
for the rest of his life. (Element number three)
The elements of equitable estoppel have been met.
hearing officer's decision should be reversed.
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The

POINT IV
THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S
INTERPRETATION OF OVERTIME HAS NOT
INTERFERED WITH AN EXISTING EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT AND RESTRICTED THE MEMBERS' RIGHT
TO CONTRACT FOR THEIR LABOR.
The Utah State Personnel Management Act (§67-19-1 et.
seq., Utah Code Ann.) provides that it is the policy of the
state "to ensure its employees opportunities for satisfying
careers and fair treatment. . ." §67-19-2(6), Utah Code Ann.
While this Act specifically applies to state employees,
it

requires

negotiate

(and permits)

contracts

compensation.

employees

regarding

and

departments

work periods

and

to

overtime

§67-19-6.7, Utah Code Ann.

The State of Utah has adopted

statutory provisions

defining and authorizing collective bargaining.

§34-20-1,

et. seq., Utah Code Ann. Employees of political subdivisions
are authorized to self-organize and to bargain collectively
for their mutual protection.

§34-20-7, Utah Code Ann.

Furthermore, cities are authorized to bind themselves to
bargaining agreements provided they do not "contract beyond
the scope of its power".
Park City Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ, 879 P.2d 267
(Ut. App. 1994)
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Following the July 1, 1985 ruling of Garcia, Ogden City
changed its work period policy for police officers to take
advantage

of the extra hours exemption

amendments.

created

by FLSA

Instead of a 40 hour work week, it adopted a

seven day work period in which an officer could be required to
work 43 hours before overtime compensation was required.
Negotiations

between

Ogden

and

its police

officers

continued during the following 4 years in order to establish
a comp-time policy.

In 1989, employees of the Ogden Police

Department sought to utilize these three hours referred to as
"GAP time" towards their retirement.

These negotiations

ultimately resulted in an agreement to provide "GAP time"
alternatives.

Employees were given the choice of electing

comp time or being paid at regular time and having the pay
count towards their retirement benefits.

Those who elected

the latter would have their contribution withheld and the
employer's

contribution would

be added

and

sent

to the

Retirement System. This process went into effect in April of
1990. They have negotiated for their own mutual benefit. The
City has not exceeded its authority.

The Retirement System

should not be able to interfere with these negotiations.
CONCLUSION
The AHO's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should
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be reversed. The meaning of the term "overtime" found in Utah
Code Ann. §49-4-103 (1) (c) should not include the GAP time
these police officers are required to work without overtime
compensation.

The Utah Retirement System should be estopped

from refusing to include contributions based upon "GAP time"
hours worked since it was aware of the detrimental reliance
its acceptance of these contributions had upon O'Keefe and
similarly affected members.
with

the

contractual

The system should not interfere

negotiations

of

the

City

and

its

employees so long as the actuarial soundness of the plan is
maintained.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 7 ^

day of January, 1996.

FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON

R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Appellant
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
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BRIAN R. FLORENCE

ADDENDUM
July 12, 1994 Notice of Denial
Stipulation and Agreement by Petitioner and Respondent
(Stipulation of Facts)
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to Dismiss
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UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-2099
(801)366-7700
1-800-365-8772 TOLL FREE
(801) 366-7705 FAX
M. DEE WILLIAMS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

July 12, 1994

Mr. Brian R. Florence
Florence and Hutchison
Attorneys at Law
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT. 84401
Dear Mr. Florence:
Regarding your letter of July 1, 1994 concerning gap time for Ogden City police officers.
The Board has always administered the statute governing the public safety employees
retirement plan with a full-time basis. Full-time being 40 hours per week. All overtime beyond 40
hours was and is ineligible for compensation definitions or inclusion in computing the final
average salary figure.
If you do not agree, you may appeal to our Adjudicative Hearing Officer, Mr. James L.
Barker. The materials needed for the appeals process are enclosed.
Sincerely,
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
?

M. Dee Williams
Executive Director
MDW:sbc
Enclosures

EDGAR H THRONDSEN PRESIDENT
HURLEY D HANSEN V»Cc PRESIDENT

LEROYG FAER8ER
DANNIE R. M C CONK1E

EDWARD T ALTcR
MARY A. GARNER

KEVIN A. HOWARD [4343]
Attorney for Respondent
560 East 200 South, Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 366-7471

BRIAN FLORENCE
Attorney for Petitioner
818-26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 399-9291

BUCK FROERER
Attorney for Ogden City
2484 Washington Blvd., #320
Ogden, Utah 84401-2319
(801) 629-8145

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR.,
Petitioner,

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
BY PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT

vs.

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent
Joseph W. O'Keefe, Jr, Petitioner, the Utah State Retirement Board, Respondent, and Ogden
City, Third Party Intervenor, pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-9, by and through counsel hereby stipulate and agree to the following background and facts:
BACKflROTJND

This case arises out of a disagreement between Joe O'Keefe, Petitioner, and others similarly
situated, who are police officers employed by Ogden City and the Utah Retirement Systems
("URS"), over the refusal of URS to accept retirement contributions on "GAP" time - i.e. a three

[KEVlNVGAPl.MTNl
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(3) hour period worked by Petitioner over and above the regular 40 hour pay period. The URS
position is that this additional time worked is "overtime" and is excluded from coverage under Utah
law. The Petitioner's position is that this time should be treated as regular time and URS should be
ordered to accept the contributions paid since 1990 and include "GAP" time in the final average
salary component used to calculate Petitioner's retirement allowance. Both sides agree that if the
decision of the Hearing Officer is in favor of Petitioner, the decision will be applied both
prospectively and retroactively to cover contributions paid on behalf of Petitioner and others
similarly situated since 1990.
The following Stipulation of Facts is intended to serve as the sole factual basis for the
determination in this case. Accompanying memoranda of law will be supplied in accordance with
the schedule established by the Hearing Officer.
STTPTTTATTON OF FACTS

1.

Petitioner, Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety

employees employed by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy.
2.

On July 1, 1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under certain

prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per week.
3.

In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between Ogden City and its employees, including

Petitioner, an agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week but
not more than 43 hours per week could be treated in either of two ways:
a.)

The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to as "GAP" time) could be taken

later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or
b.)

The "GAP" time could be treated as regular compensation (paid at regular - not
2

overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on
which retirement contributions would be paid.
4.

The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final three (3)

years of Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement allowance
of Petitioner - estimated as follows:
A.

Assuming a May 1,1995 retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit
would be $1,819.68.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,697.34.

B.

Assuming a July 1,1995 retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit
would be $1,842.48.
If the URS does not accept contributions on GAP time and the additional
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,717.80.

Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if GAP time is determined to be eligible time
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month.
5.

In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions to the
3

retirement systems for those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional time (GAP) worked
as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate
participating members' accounts, including Petitioner.
6.

In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden City. In

1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992.
7.

Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the GAP time contributions

were ineligible and refunded the GAP time contributions to Ogden City for the appropriate years.
8.

During the period from 1992 to the present, Petitioner has taken the position that both the

original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been
refunded. URS has taken the position that the office ruled the contributions ineligible as soon as it
had actual knowledge of the GAP time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until^an employee
sought to retire with GAP time included as part of compensation.
9.

During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others similarly

situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these
discussions the retirement office agreed to resume its acceptance of Gap time contributions^while
A J additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a permanent policy covering Gap time
contributions.
10.

Pe^Tio**^. W n ^ W
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Also during this time another employing unit, Weber County, requested Gap time coverage.

All the parties then agreed that the board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should determine any
actuarial impact which would result from including GAP time in "compensation" for retirement
purposes.
11.

The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to M. Dee Williams,
4
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Executive Director of URS, on June 2, 1994:
"As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-hour work week.
However, officers are allowed a choice between (i) taking direct pay for the three
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the
time as comp time, but as they approach retirement, officers can and do switch to
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their Average Annual Compensation,
resulting in a higher retirement benefit.
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%.
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid
for earlier)."
12.

As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently deny

GAP time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative, i.e.
URS decision to include GAP time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at the
cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the Legislature, not URS.
13.

Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety officers

actually received a retirement allowance with Gap time included. The retirement office has agreed
to honor those retirements.
14.

These are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers have

elected to take their Gap time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute.
5

These facts constitute the entire background and facts upon which Petitioner and Respondent
seek an adjudication- All parties are prepared and desire to submit memoranda of law in support of
their respective positions, including Ogden City, which will be in accordance with the following
schedule:
Petitioner's Brief - 30 days from the filing of the Stipulation of Facts with the Hearing
Officer.
Respondent's Brief - 30 days from the receipt of Petitioner's Brief.
Third Party Intervenors Brief - 30 days from the receipt of Petitioner's Brief.
Petitioner's Reply Brief - 10 days from the receipt of Respondent's and Third Party
Intervenor's Briefs, whichever is later.
Agreed to this

3Iyr~

day of March, 1995.

f ^ l w - A cffL^ cWTA
Brian Florence
Attorney for Petitioner

Kevin A. Howard
Attorney for Respondent

J&MLI&IA
Buck Froerer
Attorney for Ogden City
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

JOSEPH W. O'KEEFE, JR.,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER TO DISMISS

Petitioner,

vs.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent.

Based upon the evidence received at the evidentiary hearing in this matter and the legal
memoranda submitted by both parties, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer makes the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner, Joe O'Keefe and other peace officers similarly situated are public safety

employees employed by Ogden City, and have been for the entire period of this controversy.
2.

On July 1,1985, Ogden City initiated a program whereby its peace officers, under

certain prescribed and agreed upon circumstances, could be required to work more than 40 hours per
week.

1

[Kevin/Okeefe.ord]

3.

In 1989, as a result of negotiations held between Ogden City and its employees,

including Petitioner, an agreement was reached whereby any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week but not more than 43 hours per week could be treated in either of two ways:
A.

The three (3) hours in question (commonly referred to as "Gap" time) could

be taken later as leave, pursuant to which no compensation would be paid; or
B.

The "Gap" time could be treated as regular compensation (paid at regular -

not overtime rates), pursuant to which the officer would receive additional compensation on
which retirement contributions would be paid.
4.

The effect of the additional compensation and retirement contributions in the final

three (3) years of Petitioner's employment would result in an increase in the monthly retirement
allowance of Petitioner - estimated as follows:
A.

Assuming a May 1,1995, retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on "Gap" time and the additional

compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance , the benefit
would be $1,819.68.
If the URS does not accept contributions on "Gap" time and the additional
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,697.34.
B.

Assuming a July 1,1995, retirement date:
If the URS accepts contributions on "Gap" time and the additional

compensation is used in the calculation of the retirement allowance, the benefit
would be $1,842.48.
2

If the URS does wi accept contributions on "Gap" time and the additional
compensation is not used in the calculation of the retirement benefit, the benefit
would be $1,717.80.
Thus, Petitioner's retirement allowance, if "Gap" time is determined to be eligible time
worked under Utah laws, would increase anywhere between $122.34 - $124.68 per month.
5.

In 1990, Ogden City began sending the first employer and employee contributions

to the retirement systems for those employees who chose to treat the 3 hour additional time ("Gap")
worked as "regular compensation." URS received and credited these contributions to the appropriate
participating members' accounts, including Petitioner.
6.

In 1991, due to an administrative oversight, no contributions were sent by Ogden

City. In 1992, Ogden City forwarded the required contributions for both 1991 and 1992.
7.

Upon receipt of the 1992 contributions, URS determined that the "Gap" time

contributions were ineligible and refunded the "Gap" time contributions to Ogden City for the
appropriate years.
8.

During the period from 1992 to the present, Petitioner has taken the position that both

the original 1990 contributions and subsequent contributions were eligible and should not have been
refunded. URS has taken the position that the Retirement Office ruled the contributions ineligible
as soon as it had actual knowledge of the "Gap" time issues. Actual knowledge did not occur until
some time in 1992 when an employee sought to retire with "Gap" time included as part of
compensation.
9.

During this same period, officials from URS, Ogden City, Petitioner, and others

similarly situated met in an attempt to resolve the different interpretations of the law. During these
3

discussions the Retirement Office agreed to resume its acceptance of "Gap" time contributions
conditionally while an additional study took place on the feasibility of developing a permanent
policy covering "Gap" time contributions. Petitioner believed a permanent policy had been adopted
and the contributions were being accepted unconditionally.
10.

Also during this time another employing unit, Weber County, requested "Gap" time

coverage. All the parties then agreed that the Board's actuary, Wyatt and Associates, should
determine any actuarial impact which would result from including "Gap" time in "compensation"
for retirement purposes.
11.

The actuary's assumptions and response was delivered in a letter to M. Dee Williams,

Executive Director of URS, on June 2, 1994:
As explained to us, Ogden police officers have a 43-hour work week.
However, officers are allowed a choice between (I) taking direct pay for the three
hours over 40, or (ii) taking this time as additional comp time. Most officers take the
time as comp time, but as they approach retirement, officers can and do switch to
taking this as pay. By doing so, they increase their Average Annual Compensation,
resulting in a higher retirement benefit.
This policy increases the employer's contribution rate from 9.8% to 11.7%.
Our calculation assumes that all members elect to maximize their retirement benefit i.e., they will be able to plan well enough in advance to increase their retirement
benefits by 7.5% (the ratio of the 3 extra hours to the 40 hours they were being paid
for earlier).
12.

As a result of the actuary's findings and conclusions, URS resolved to permanently

deny "Gap" time contributions. An additional reason for denial was forwarded - any administrative,
i.e. URS decision to include "Gap" time would indeed be adding a benefit to the existing system at
the cost determined by the actuary. Such an added benefit with a potential cost to all employers and
employees, not just to Ogden City and its employees, should be decided by the legislature, not URS.
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13.

Petitioner has brought to URS' attention that a small number of Ogden Public Safety

officers actually received a retirement allowance with "Gap" time included. The Retirement Office
has agreed to honor those retirements.
14.

There are twenty two (22) Ogden police officers left in this dispute. Ten (10) officers

have elected to take their "Gap" time contribution refunds and are excluded from this dispute.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioner's appeal for inclusion of "Gap" time as compensation for retirement purposes and
for the Board to accept contributions thereon is based on a number of theories - each of them will
be discussed herein.
1.

Petitioner seeks a determination that federal law be used to define "overtime."

Petitioner is certainly correct that "overtime compensation" is subject to federal law. The stipulated
facts (No. 3) show that Petitioner and his employer, Ogden City, were aware of federal requirements
when negotiating the treatment of "Gap" time. However, just because federal law is applicable to
the treatment of "Gap" time between Petitioner and his employer does not mean that federal law
governs the operation of Utah's statutory retirement systems. In fact, public pension plans are
specifically exempt from the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") which
controls pension activities in general. Petitioner has not demonstrated that federal law controls. The
legislature is still free to establish what compensation is includable for retirement purposes.
The more persuasive argument is that state law controls. Under state retirement statutes,
Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(1)(c)(1) specifically excludes overtime. No definition of overtime
appears under Title 49. However, Utah Code Ann. § 49-4-103(3) does provide that "full-time
service means 2,080 hours per year." Petitioner claims that should only be interpreted to establish
5

a minimum requirement for membership. However, the definition itself carries no such limited
application. The Board's interpretation does not appear to be unreasonable, especially when coupled
with the actuary's conclusion that the adoption of Petitioner's position would result in a substantial
increase both in benefits and in contribution rates for employers and/or employees. This appears to
be within the Board's mandate "to maintain, in conjunction with participating employers and
members, the systems, plans and programs on an actuarially sound or approved basis...." Utah
Code Ann. § 49-1-203.
Therefore, this court concludes that state law, not federal law applies to this matter.
2.

Petitioner's second major contention is that the Board's interpretation of overtime

unreasonably interfered with an existing employment contract between Petitioner and his employer
and restricted the member's right to contract for labor. No evidence exists on the record that the
Board or its agents were in any way involved in the negotiation process between Petitioner and his
employer. Indeed, the statutes governing compensation were in existence in 1989 at the time of
these negotiations. Petitioner and his employer should have known this. The brief submitted by
Ogden City appears to support the Board's position in this case.
Therefore, this court concludes that the Board did not interfere with any contract right of
Petitioner.
3.

The final argument forwarded by Petitioner is based on the doctrine of estoppel. That

doctrine, as Petitioner properly states requires (1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the
second party that would result from allowing the act, or failure to act.
6

Petitioner has not met his burden of proof for applying the doctrine. The stipulation states
that he reasonably believed that a permanent policy had been adopted and that contributions were
being accepted unconditionally. But, the stipulation also states that he was aware that the Board
agreed to resume its acceptance of "Gap" time contributions only conditionally, and that on June 2,
1994, prior to retiring, that the actuary had recommended raising the employer's contribution rate,
and that the Board had resolved to deny the "Gap" contributions. Therefore, this court concludes
Petitioner has not met the elements required to invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Petitioner's request that the Board be required to accept "Gap" time contributions during the
last four years is denied.
Dated this

/eZ

day of October, 1995.

James L. Barker, Jr.
Adjudicative Hearing Officer
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the Adjudicative
Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.
DATED this

/<$

day of October, 1995.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
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